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Abstract. In this investigation we explore a general strategy for constructing modal theories
where the modal notion is conceived as a predicate. The idea of this strategy is to develop modal
theories over axiomatic theories of truth. In this first paper of our two part investigation we develop
the general strategy and then apply it to the axiomatic theory of truth Friedman-Sheard. We thereby
obtain the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. The theory Modal Friedman-Sheard is then discussed
from three different perspectives. First, we show that Modal Friedman-Sheard preserves theorem-
hood modulo translation with respect to modal operator logic. Second, we turn to semantic aspects
and develop a modal semantics for the newly developed theory. Third, we investigate whether the
modal predicate of Modal Friedman-Sheard can be understood along the lines of a proposal of
Kripke, namely as a truth predicate modified by a modal operator.
§1. Introduction. In philosophical logic, there are two ways of formalizing modal no-
tions. The first way, the orthodox approach, conceives of modalities as sentential operators
which applied to a sentence yield a new sentence. The second, alternative way conceives
of modalities as sentential predicates which applied to the name of a sentence yield a new
sentence. This second approach has the advantage that it respects the fundamental intuition
that truth and the modal notions are expressions of the same grammatical category and
should therefore be treated uniformly. The predicate approach also ties in well with the
so-called relational analysis of propositional attitudes and, finally, has a greater expressive
strength than the operator approach, at least as this latter approach is standardly conceived.
Despite the initial appeal of the predicate approach to modality only few attempts have
been made so far in developing a workable and philosophically attractive approach of this
kind. The problem we face when we take up this task is that the seemingly impeccable and
intuitive modal principles we know from modal operator logic lead straight to paradox if
we adopt them in the predicate setting. In this two-part investigation we propose a strategy
that overcomes these difficulties and apply this strategy in developing two particular modal
theories, the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard and the theory Modal Kripke-Feferman. In a
nutshell our strategy is to characterize the modal notion viz. the modal predicate by its
interaction with the notion of truth viz. the truth predicate. In doing so we can analyze
the modal paradoxes as manifestations of the well-known paradoxicality of the concept
of truth. Consequently, or so we shall argue, if we adopt a consistent system of truth, we
arrive at a consistent system of truth and modality.
In this first paper of our investigation we lay out the general strategy we apply in
developing the modal theories and we construct the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. This
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newly developed theory Modal Friedman-Sheard will then be shown to satisfy a minimal
adequacy condition we think an interesting modal theory ought to fulfill. We show that
the theory preserves theoremhood modulo translation with respect to modal operator logic.
A modal theory should satisfy this criterion for otherwise one would take a revisionist
stance with respect to important work in philosophical and mathematical logic. If one
is aiming toward a general modal theory that is neutral with respect to the particular
philosophical theory of modality adopted, we think it is advisable to avoid revisionist
positions in connection with established work.
We then turn to more semantic aspects and provide, building upon work by Gupta
(1982), Herzberger (1982), Belnap & Gupta (1993), and Halbach (1994), a novel modal se-
mantics, namely modal revision semantics. As the name indicates the semantics combines
ideas from revision semantics with possible world semantics for modal operator logic. We
show that the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard axiomatizes in some relevant sense this very
semantics. That is, Modal Friedman-Sheard stands in the same relation to modal revision
semantics as the theory of truth Friedman-Sheard stands to ordinary revision semantics:
Modal Friedman-Sheard axiomatizes modal revision semantics up to the first transfinite
ordinal ω.
Finally, we take up a third theme and investigate whether the modal predicate we have
axiomatized can be understood along the lines of an idea put forward by Kripke in his
seminal “Outline of a Theory of Truth” Kripke (1975). Kripke suggested defining (or
understanding) a modal predicate by a truth predicate which has been modified by a modal
operator, that is, the modal operator acts as a predicate modifier on the truth predicate to
yield a modal predicate. In the case of an alethic modality the proposal would amount
to understanding the predicate ‘is necessary’ (‘N ’) to be an abbreviation for the complex
predicate ‘is necessarily true’ (‘T ’).
Kripke’s proposal is sometimes understood as a strategy for recovering the expressive
strength of the predicate approach within the operator setting and, consequently, as an
argument in favor of operator approaches to modality.1 We do not think that this is a good
understanding of Kripke’s proposal because at best the proposal serves as an argument in
favor of treating modal notions as predicate modifiers rather than as sentential operators.
Furthermore, understanding modal notions as operators violates one of the main grammat-
ical constraints on formal treatments of modality which is to treat truth and the modalities
in a grammatical uniform way.
In fact, Kripke himself advocated a very different understanding of his proposal. He
viewed his proposal as a vindication of predicate approaches to modality against the back-
drop of the liar-like paradoxes that threaten these approaches:
Ironically, the application of the present approach [his theory of truth]
to languages with modal operators may be of some interest to those
who dislike intensional operators and possible worlds and prefer to take
predicates true of sentences (or sentence tokens). (...) Now if a necessity
operator and a truth predicate are allowed, we could define a necessity
predicate Nec(x) applied to sentences, either by T (x) or by T (
.
x)
[slight change of notation] according to taste (...).2
1 Cf. Halbach & Welch (2009) for an understanding of Kripke’s proposal along these lines.
2 See Kripke (1975, p. 713/14).
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Following Kripke we investigate whether the primitive modal predicate we have
introduced can be understood in this way. As our study is carried out from a more
proof-theoretic perspective we also try to answer this question in a proof-theoretic way. To
this end we formulate the theory of truth Friedman-Sheard in a modal operator language
with a truth predicate and show that the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard is reducible to this
very theory. That is, if we translate the modal predicate by the truth predicate modified
by the modal operator and keep the remaining vocabulary fixed, then theoremhood is
preserved modulo translation from the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard to the theory of
truth Friedman-Sheard as formulated in the modal operator language.3 The success of
this reduction which we label the “Kripke reduction” provides a conceptual insight into
why the strategy of characterizing the modal predicate by appeal to its interaction with
the truth predicate works so well—at least in the present case. In applying this strategy
we have axiomatized the modal predicate in a way that allows for an understanding of the
modal predicate as defined by the truth predicate and a modal operator. Since the modal
operator we consider behaves in a standard way the reduction shows that if the modal
predicate is axiomatized in the way we have proposed there remains only one poten-
tially paradoxical concept, that is the concept of truth. Consequently, if we guarantee the
consistency of the theory of truth we adopt we get consistency of our modal theory for
free.
1.1. Structure of the paper. The paper structures as follows. In the first section after
the introduction we lay out the general strategy and methodology we employ in construct-
ing our modal theory. The modal theory, that is Modal Friedman-Sheard, is presented in
the next section in which we also show that the theory is adequate from the perspective of
modal operator logic. In a further section we turn to semantic considerations and present
modal revision semantics. We end the discussion of semantic aspects of our approach by
establishing the semantic adequacy result we have alluded to before. That is, we show that
Modal Friedman-Sheard axiomatizes modal revision semantics up to the first transfinite
ordinal ω. In the last technical section we present the details of the “Kripke reduction” we
have briefly outlined above. The paper ends with a very short summary of the results we
have obtained and an outlook to future work.
1.2. Notation. In what is to come we let LPA be the language of arithmetic contain-
ing the logical constants ¬, ∧, and ∀, the identity symbol = and the usual arithmetical
vocabulary 0, S, +, ×. Moreover, we assume the language to contain a finite number of
function symbols for certain primitive recursive functions such as the substitution function.
Additional logical constants that we use in our study are taken to be defined in the usual
way. We take LPAT (LPAN ) to be the extension of LPA by a one-place predicate T (N ).
Correspondingly, LPAT N is LPA extended by two one-place predicates T and N . PA is the
theory Peano arithmetic supplemented by the defining equations for the function symbols
of the language. PAT (PAN, PATN) is PA in the language LPAT (LPAN , LPAT N ) where
we allow for formulas of the extended language in the induction scheme. In general, if
we speak of a theory in an extended language we also allow formulas of the extended
language to appear in the induction scheme. Similarly, if we speak of a theory in an
extended language, we also tacitly assume the syntactical predicates and function symbols
3 A similar reduction has recently been carried out by Halbach & Welch (2009). Yet, Halbach and
Welch’s investigation is purely semantic in character as they show the translation to preserve truth
between two intended semantics.
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occurring in the axioms of the theory to be replaced by the corresponding predicates and
function symbols of the extended language.
We assume some appropriate coding scheme for expressions of LPA and its extensions
and denote the code, that is, the Gödel number of an expression ζ by #ζ . The numeral of
#ζ will be conveyed by ζ. We let the sets SentL (“L-sentences”), T ermL (“L-terms”),
and CtermL (“L-closed terms”) represent themselves and, moreover, drop the subscript
when no confusion may arise. In most cases, if Λ is a syntactic operation we represent it
by Λ
.
. However, there are a few exceptions to this rule: num•(·) represents the function
that yields the Gödel number of the numeral of the argument as an output; we represent the
ternary substitution function by x(y/v) and, moreover, let V al(·) represent the function
that takes codes of closed terms as arguments and provides their denotation as output.
Importantly, V al(·) is not a function symbol of the language. We follow Halbach (2011)
in writing ∀t (φ(t)) as abbreviation of the lengthy ∀x(CtermL(x) → φ(x)) and, similarly,
abbreviate φ(x)(t/x) by φ( t
.
) where, again, t is considered to be a name of a closed
term of the language.
§2. The strategy. In this section we outline our general strategy which we will then
implement in developing the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. If we treat modalities as
predicates and allow for self-referential sentences in our language we run into paradoxes
similar to those of the notion of truth. And, indeed, as has been pointed out by Montague
(1963) we cannot adopt the most basic principles of modal operator logic within the
predicate setting for sake of paradox:
THEOREM 2.1 (Montague). Let  be a theory extending Robinson arithmetic in LPAN
and ‘N’ a one-place predicate. If for every sentence φ ∈ LPAN
(i)  	 Nφ → φ
(i i)  	 φ ⇒  	 Nφ
then  is inconsistent.
Now the principles of modal operator logic corresponding to (i) and (ii) above
(T ) φ → φ
(Nec)
φ
φ
are of course used in axiomatizing many philosophically salient modal notions. Therefore,
it seems we fall short of providing a philosophically satisfactory treatment of modality
within the predicate setting. As a matter of fact, this has led many to conclude that we
cannot have the most intuitive modal principles once we treat modalities as predicates.4
Yet, once we introduce a truth predicate into the picture, that is, once we work in a setting
where we have an interacting truth and modal predicate at our disposal there may be a
possible way out of this dilemma. For what seems to motivate the modal principle (T ) and
thus condition (i) in Theorem 2.1 is the plausibility of
“Everything that is necessary is true.”
4 See Stern (forthcoming) for a careful discussion of Montague’s theorem and its philosophical
consequences.
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However, having the truth predicate at our disposal this natural language sentence appears
to be best formalized within the predicate setting by
(T ′) ∀x(Sent (x) → (N x → T x))
And whether paradox arises once (T ′) is assumed instead of condition (i) remains open
and depends on the properties one ascribes to the truth predicate. The main difference
between (i) and (T ′) is of course that where in (i) a sentence is disquoted, that is, we
eliminate an occurrence of a sentential predicate, no disquotation takes place within (T ′).
Rather, disquotation is licensed only if the properties of the truth predicate allow us to
apply disquotation to (an instance of) the consequent of (T ′).
This reaction to Montague’s paradox is of course congenial to the prominent philosoph-
ical idea that all the liar-like paradoxes have a common origin, namely the paradoxicality
of the concept of truth. For example Horsten (2002) writes:
“There is a view which holds that the relation between these paradoxes
[the modal paradoxes, J.S.] goes deeper. The idea is that there is an un-
derlying conceptual connection between the notions [the modal notions;
J.S.] involved which explains why they are all paradoxical. This view is
usually combined with the belief that at bottom there is only one para-
doxical concept: truth. All the Liar-like paradoxes are just manifestations
of the paradoxicality of the concept truth.” (See Horsten (2002, p. 215);
the italics are due to Horsten.)
While we do not wish to embrace the view outlined by Horsten, it seems worthwhile
to take it seriously and to see where it leads us. In a way the view formally amounts to
avoiding introduction and elimination of the modal predicate independently of the truth
predicate. The idea is that if we have, say, a sentence Nφ we should not stipulate a
principle or rule that allows us to infer φ. And the same holds for the converse direction.
Instead, the transition between a sentence in its quoted form within a sentence Nφ and
the assertion of the sentence itself should always go via the detour of the truth predicate,
that is, the sentence T φ. Indeed spelled out in this way the view we have outlined seems
to be well motivated if one adopts the deflationist idea that quotation and disquotation are
the function of the truth predicate. Consequently, quotation and disquotation of sentences is
not the task of the modal predicate and in formulating modal principles we should therefore
avoid the introduction or elimination of the modal predicates without the detour via the
truth predicate.5 In the remainder of the paper we adopt the idea that the transition between
a sentence in its quoted form and the assertion of the sentence itself should always go via
the detour of the truth predicate as our general guideline or strategy in formulating the
modal theories.
Whereas (T ′) fits well with the view we have just outlined, condition (i) of Theorem
2.1 eliminates an occurrence of the modal predicate without taking the detour via the truth
predicate. Thereby the sentence to which the modal predicate was applied gets disquoted.
This suggests adopting (T ′) as the predicate version of the principle (T ) of modal operator
logic. Similarly, the second assumption used in establishing Montague’s paradox, that is
the predicate version of the rule of necessitation, does not fit well with the view outlined as
this time the modal predicate is introduced without taking the detour via the truth predicate.
5 The idea of connecting the view we have outlined to deflationism was suggested to us by Martin
Fischer.
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Rather in alignment with the above view we should modify the rule of necessitation to the
effect that we are allowed to infer Nφ whenever we have derived T φ. This would
leave us with the rule
(T -Nec)
T φ
Nφ
If we consider the characteristic principles (4) and (E) of the philosophically most
interesting modal operator logics S4 and S5,6 that is
(4) φ → φ
(E) ¬φ → ¬φ
in their straightforward formulation once we take the modal notion to be a predicate we
arrive at the following principles7
(P4) ∀t (Sent (V al(t)) → (N V al(t) → N N
.
t))
(P E) ∀t (Sent (V al(t)) → (¬N V al(t) → N ¬
.
N
.
t))
But again the principles (P4) and (PE) violate the condition we have proposed because
both principles introduce an additional modal predicate without taking the detour via the
truth predicate. In doing so the modal sentence asserted in the antecedens of the principles
gets quoted in the consequence of the principles. Yet, we can bring (P4) and (P E) in
compliance with our general strategy by pushing the modal sentence in the antecedens of
(P4) and (P E) in the scope of the truth predicate. Thus (P4) and (P E) transform into the
modal principles
(4′) ∀t (T N
.
t → N N
.
t).
(E ′) ∀t (T ¬
.
N
.
t → N ¬
.
N
.
t)
Moreover, in general, it seems that the modal properties which are meant to be expressed
by the principles of modal operator logic (T ), (4), and (E), and the rule (Nec) are also
conveyed by the principles (T ′), (4′), and (E ′), and the rule (T -Nec) as the truth predicate
should not have any impact in this respect. We also think that the principles (T ′), (4′),
and (E ′) and the rule (T -Nec) are supported by our natural language intuition to the
same degree the principles of modal operator logic are. Of course these kind of natural
language intuitions should be met with some care in an area where paradox is lurking
behind every corner. However, there seems to be nothing problematic about these principles
and there seems to be no reason why we should avoid them or no longer pursue the formal
consequences of the view outlined above.
Now, if we pursue this strategy, we intimately bind our theory of modality to the prop-
erties of the truth predicate. Depending on which properties one ascribes to the truth
6 The modal operator logics S4 and S5 are normal modal logics, that is both extend classical
propositional logic by the modal principle (K ) (cf. below) and are closed under necessitation
(Nec). S4 extends the basic normal logic K (which precisely consists of the propositional
tautologies, the modal principle (K ) and the rule (Nec)) by the modal axiom (T ) and (4) while
S5 extends S4 by the modal axiom (E). For more on modal operator logic, see Blackburn et al.
(2001) and, Fitting & Mendelsohn (1998).
7 As one of the advantages of the predicate approach is to quantify over the argument position of
the modal notion at stake by the means of simple first-order quantification, we replace schematic
formulations by their universally quantified counterparts.
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predicate, that is, which axiomatic theory of truth one adopts, a different theory of modality
will arise. In the remainder of the paper we shall then test our strategy with respect to
the axiomatic theory of truth Friedman-Sheard. We will therefore investigate what modal
theory Friedman-Sheard gives rise to, if supplemented by the modal axioms (T ′), (4′), and
(E ′), and the rule (T -Nec). We apply the strategy to the theory of truth Kripke-Feferman
in a sequel to this paper. This should allow us to see how widely applicable our strategy is
and to compare the modal theories arising from the two different theories of truth.
Besides these three modal principles and the rule (T -Nec) we shall also adopt the
predicate version of the basic axiom of normal modal operator logic
(K ) (φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ).
That is, we adopt the principle
(KN ) ∀x, y(Sent (x →. y) → (N (x →. y) → (N x → N y)))
For rather instrumental reasons we also take the modal principles
(RegN ) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent (∀. vx) → (V al(s) = V al(t) → (N x(s/v) ↔ N x(t/v))))
(N D) ∀s, t (V al(s) = V al(t) → Ns =
.
t)
(B F) ∀x, v(Sent (∀
.
vx) → (∀t N x(t/v) → N ∀
.
vx))
to be axioms of the modal theory. (RegN ) is a formalized version of the substitution
principle and forces the modal context to be referentially transparent. (N D), “necessity
of distinctness”, asserts that if the value of two terms is distinct, then the two terms will
necessarily have distinct values. (B F) is a formalized ω-rule which allows us to infer from
the necessity of every instantiation of an universally quantified formula to the necessity
of the formula itself. A more philosophical gloss on (B F) is that it tells us that we have
names (or terms) in the language for everything that could possibly exist. While this is
surely not a plausible assumption on the general scheme, it seems acceptable once we work
within an arithmetical setting and, indeed, the three mentioned axioms are tailor made for a
framework in which we appeal to an arithmetical theory as our base and syntax theory: it is
often thought that arithmetical truths are necessary truths, that the terms of the arithmetical
language refer rigidly and that what could possibly arithmetically exist, does exist.
In fact, we wish the arithmetical truths to come out as necessary. Incidentally, this was
the main reason for adopting (RegN ), (N D), and (B F). We want arithmetical truth to
turn out necessary because we want our syntax theory to be rigid: we need to guarantee
that the names of the syntactical objects and operations do in fact always designate these
objects and operations. Otherwise we would not be sure whether the modal axioms convey
the meaning we intend them to convey. If, for example, a numeral codes a closed term in
certain circumstances but a parenthesis, say, in others then clearly the axioms (4′) and (E ′)
would no longer express the modal properties we intend them to convey, but would instead
be nonsensical.8
Whereas the previous principles all have been theory-unspecific, that is they should be
axioms of any modal theory no matter which axiomatic theory of truth one assumes, there
8 The reader might wonder why we have added (N D) and (B F) to our list of axioms but have
omitted the principles
(N I ) ∀s, t (V al(s) = V al(t) → Ns =
.
t)
(C B F) ∀x, v(Sent (∀
.
vx) → (N ∀
.
vx → ∀t N x(t/v)))
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will also be theory-specific principles. For instance in the present case we consider a modal
principle which fits the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard we are about to develop but which
would seem implausible if an alternative theory of truth were assumed. We will turn to this
very principle once we present the details of the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard.
§3. The theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. We shall now begin the construction of
the modal theory we obtain, if the theory “Friedman-Sheard” is assumed as our underlying
theory of truth. We first recall the essentials of the theory Friedman-Sheard.
3.1. Friedman-Sheard. The theory “Friedman-Sheard” first appeared as system D in
Friedman and Sheard’s “An Axiomatical Approach to Self-Referential Truth” Friedman
and Sheard (1987) and was further discussed by Sheard (1994, 2001) and Halbach (1994)
who coined the name F S. The following axiomatization of F S is due to Halbach (2011):
DEFINITION 3.1 (F S). The theory F S consists of all axioms of PA in the language LPAT
and the following axioms
(F S1) ∀s∀t (T (s =
.
t) ↔ V al(s) = V al(t))
(F S2) ∀x(Sent (x) → (T ¬
.
x ↔ ¬T x))
(F S3) ∀x, y(Sent (x ∧
.
y) → (T (x ∧
.
y) ↔ T x ∧ T y))
(F S4) ∀v∀x(Sent (∀
.
vx) → (T (∀
.
vx) ↔ ∀t (T x(t/v)))).
F S is closed under the rules
(T -Elim)
T φ
φ
(T -I ntro)
φ
T φ
for all φ ∈ SentLPAT .
The distinguishing feature of F S is the axiom (F S2) together with the fact that it is closed
under T -I ntro and T -Elim. This leads to the truth predicate being consistent and complete
and implies that the inner and the outer logic of F S are identical. Thus F S is symmetric
and the truth predicate of F S is normal in the sense of modal operator logic, that is, KT
(KT ) ∀x, y(Sent (x →. y) → (T (x →. y) → (T x → T y)))
is a theorem of F S.
THEOREM 3.2. The theory F S is consistent.
Proof. See Friedman & Sheard (1987). Later in this paper we sketch an alternative proof
due to Halbach (1994, 2011). 
A final noteworthy fact concerning F S is that it proves the global reflection principle for
PAT, that is
(RefT ) ∀x(Sent (x) → (BewPAT (x) → T x))
is a theorem of F S.
that is “Necessity of Identity” and “The Converse Barcan Formula”. These two principles,
however, will be provable—or at least pertinent versions of these principles—in the theories we
are about to construct.
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3.2. Modal Friedman-Sheard. The modal theory arising from the theory of truth F S
in the language LPAT N by addition of the modal principles previously discussed will be
called “Modal Friedman-Sheard” (M F S). Besides these modal principles we introduce
one further theory specific interaction axiom, namely
(I A) ∀t (N T
.
t ↔ T N
.
t)
The gloss on (I A) in natural language is “every sentence for which it is necessary that it
is true it is true that it is necessary and vice versa” which has some initial plausibility and
seems philosophically acceptable.9 More importantly, (I A) does not introduce or eliminate
the truth or the modal predicate and therefore seems to fit well with the general theoretical
design of F S which precisely avoids axioms of this type.
As we shall see (I A) plays an important theoretic role in our investigation and can
be considered as the central axiom governing the interaction of the modal and the truth
predicate in the context of F S independently of the particular modal properties assumed.
We now define the theory M F S:
DEFINITION 3.3 (MFS). M F S consists of all axioms of F S in the language LPAT N 10 and
the axioms
(RegN ) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent (∀vx. ) → (V al(s) = V al(t) → (N x(s/v) ↔ N x(t/v))))
(N D) ∀s∀t (V al(s) = V al(t) → N (s =
.
t))
(B F) ∀v, x(Sent (∀
.
vx) → (∀t N x(t/v) → N ∀
.
vx))
(KN ) ∀x, y(Sent (x →. y) → (N (x →. y) → (N x → N y)))
(I A) ∀t (N T
.
t ↔ T N
.
t)
(T ′) ∀x(Sent (x) → (N x → T x))
(4′) ∀t (T N
.
t → N N
.
t)
(E ′) ∀t (T ¬
.
N
.
t → N ¬
.
N
.
t).
In addition to the rules of F S, the following rule is adopted.
(T -Nec)
T φ
Nφ
for all φ ∈ SentLPAT N .
The theory M F S is consistent, indeed it is LPA-conservative over F S.
9 Of course, (I A) is plausible only if we “rigidify” our syntax theory so that the name of a sentence
φ rigidly denotes the sentence φ. For otherwise, for example, the sentence ‘2 + 2 = 4’ could
mean that grass is green and thus while it would be true that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is necessary it would
not be necessary that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is true. Of course, similar problems would affect the modal
axioms (4′) and (E ′). As we have pointed out, these problems were the main reason why we
insisted on the fact that arithmetics, that is syntax theory, should come out as necessary true. From
a more philosophical perspective rigidifying the syntax theory amounts to reading a language
parameter into the modal predicate (“is necessary in English”, “is necessary inLPAT N ” instead of
“is necessary” simpliciter). See, for example, Peacocke (1976) for a discussion of these problems
and a solution along our lines.
10 As pointed out in section 1.2 this means that the syntactical predicates and function symbols
occurring in the axioms of F S are now the corresponding expressions of LPAT N . Moreover, the
induction scheme has been extended to LPAT N .
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THEOREM 3.4. M F S is a LPA-conservative extension of F S.
Proof. Using the recursion theorem11 we may define a translation function g : LPAT N →
LPAT which translates the modal predicate ‘N ’ by the truth predicate and which keeps the
remaining vocabulary fixed. It is easy to verify that the translations of all axioms of M F S
are theorems of F S and also straightforward to see that proofs in M F S translate to proofs
in F S. That is, we have for all φ ∈ LPAT N :
M F S 	 φ ⇒ F S 	 g(φ) 
REMARK 3.5. The interpretation g is not faithful! For consider ∀x, y(Sent (x ∨
.
y) →
(N (x ∨
.
y) → N x ∨ N y)) which translates to ∀x, y(SentLPAT N (x ∨. y) → (T (x ∨. y) →
T x ∨ T y)). The latter is a theorem of F S though the former is not a theorem of M F S.
The reader might find Theorem 3.4 disappointing, as it does not only show the con-
sistency but also the conservativeness of M F S over F S whereas initially one could have
hoped that the interaction of the two predicates increases the deductive power, that is, the
proof-theoretic strength, of the theory as was the case in the examples studied by Halbach
(2001, 2002). On the other hand, one may argue that any reasonable conception of an
alethic modality allows for the trivial reading, that is it allows for a reading of the modal
notion as truth. From this perspective Theorem 3.4 is not only unproblematic but desirable.
Remark 3.5 is in line with this latter view since obviously the trivial reading is not a faithful
reading of an alethic modality.
Moreover, it is unlikely that we will be able to achieve a (nontrivial) proof-theoretic
strengthening of M F S from the interaction of the truth and the modal predicate. It turns
out that virtually every introduction or elimination principle produces inconsistency once
it is added to the axioms of M F S. We provide some sample cases in the theorem below but
the reader is invited to check further introduction and elimination principles in this respect.
THEOREM 3.6. Let  be a modal theory which proves all axioms of M F S, is closed under
(T -Elim), (T -I ntro), and (T -Nec) and which proves one of the following
(i) ∀t (Sent (V al(t)) → (T N
.
t → ¬N ¬
.
V al(t)))
(ii) ∀x(Sent (x) → (N x → N ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
x))
(iii) ∀t (Sent (V al(t)) → (N V al(t) → T T
.
t))
(iv) ∀t (Sent (V al(t)) → (N N
.
t → T V al(t)).
Then  is inconsistent.
We show the latter theorem by appeal to the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.7. Let (i)–(iv) be as in Theorem 3.6. Then
(a) M F S + (i i) 	 (i)
(b) M F S + (i i i) 	 (i i)
(c) M F S + (iv) 	 (i i).
Proof. We deal with the three items in turn. Throughout we assume ‘t’ to be the code
of a closed term. Accordingly, if we write φ(t) we mean Cterm(x) → φ(x). Notice that
11 For an exposition of the recursion theorem see, for example, Monk (1976).
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when we apply necessitation we may derive Cterm(x) → Nφ(x˙) using (K ), (NecN )
and Lemma 3.9.
Case (a)
1. Sent (V al(s)) → (N V al(s) → N ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(s))) (i i)
2. Sent (V al(s)) → (N V al(s) → T ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(s))) 1, (T ′)
3. Sent (V al(s)) → (N V al(s) → ¬T N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(s))) 2, (F S2)
4. Sent (V al(s)) → (T N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(s)) → ¬N V al(s)) 3
5. Sent (¬
.
V al(t)) → (T N
.
num•(¬
.
¬
.
V al(t)) → ¬N ¬
.
V al(t))
(T N
.
num•(¬
.
¬
.
V al(t)) → ¬N ¬
.
V al(t)) 4, s .= num•(¬
.
V al(t))
6. Sent (V al(t)) → (T N
.
t → ¬N ¬
.
V al(t)) F S, (NecN ), (KN ), (RegN )
7. ∀t (Sent (V al(t)) → (T N
.
t → ¬N ¬
.
V al(t))) 6
Case (b)
1. Sent (V al(t)) → (N V al(t) → T T
.
t) (i i i)
2. Sent (V al(t)) → (¬T T
.
t → ¬N V al(t)) 1
3. Sent (V al(t)) → (T T
.
num•(¬
.
V al(t)) → ¬N V al(t)) 2, (F S2)
4. Sent (V al(t)) → (N N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(t)) → ¬N V al(t)) 3, (T ′), (I A)
5. Sent (V al(t)) → (N V al(t) → ¬N N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(t))) 4
6. Sent (V al(t)) → (N V al(t) → ¬T N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(t))) 5, (4′)
7. Sent (V al(t)) → (N V al(t) → T ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(t))) 6, (F S2)
8. Sent (V al(t)) → (N V al(t) → N ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
V al(t))) 7, (E ′)
9. ∀x(Sent (x) → (N x → N ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
x)) 8, x .= V al(t)12
Case (c)
1. Sent (V al(s)) → (N N
.
s → T V al(s)) (iv)
2. Sent (V al(s)) → (¬T V al(s) → ¬N N
.
s) 1
3. Sent (V al(s)) → (T ¬
.
V al(s) → ¬T N
.
s) 2, F S, (4′)
4. Sent (V al(s)) → (N ¬
.
V al(s) → T ¬
.
N
.
s) 3, F S, (T ′)
5. Sent (V al(s)) → (N ¬
.
V al(s) → N ¬
.
N
.
s) 4, (E ′)
6. Sent (V al(¬
.
t)) → (N ¬
.
V al(¬
.
t) → N ¬
.
N
.
¬
.
t) 5, s .= num•(¬
.
x)
7. Sent (¬
.
x) → (N ¬
.
¬
.
x → N ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
x)) 6
8. Sent (x) → (N x → N ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
x)) 7
9. ∀x(Sent (x) → (N x → N ¬
.
N
.
num•(¬
.
x))) 8

Proof of Theorem 3.6. By Lemma 3.7 it suffices to show (i). We have
1. δ ↔ ¬Nδ diagonal lemma
2. ¬δ ↔ Nδ 1
3. T ¬δ ↔ Nδ 2, (T -I ntro)
4. NNδ ↔ N¬δ 3, (T -Nec), (KN )
5. T Nδ → N¬δ 4, (4′)
6. T Nδ → ¬N¬δ (i)
7. ¬T Nδ 5, 6
8. T ¬Nδ 7, (F S2)
9. ¬Nδ 8, (T -Elim)
10. δ 1, 9
11. T δ 10, (T -I ntro)
12. Nδ 11, (T -Nec)

Due to this inconsistency result we suggest that the proponent of proof-theoretically
strong modal theories should adopt a strategy in formulating these modal theories which is
different from the one we have proposed.
12 Note that we have PAT N 	 Sent (x) → Cterm(num•(x)) which allows us to get rid of
Cterm(x) which was our implicit antecedens condition in lines 1–8.
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3.2.1. Subtheories of M F S. In formulating M F S we have not focused on the question
whether the axioms are mutually independent and, indeed, they are not. The right-to-left
direction of (I A) is provable by appeal to the remaining axioms, in particular by the axioms
(T ′) and (4′). We nonetheless included the biconditional in our axiomatization, as we will
be interested in subtheories of M F S in which (T ′) and (4′) are not available, but we always
want (I A) to be one of the axioms. Most importantly, we are interested in the subtheory
“Basic Modal Friedman-Sheard” (B M F S):
DEFINITION 3.8 (BMFS). B M F S consists of all axioms and rules of M F S except (T ′),
(4′), and (E ′). The modal theory B X1 . . . Xn M F S is the theory resulting from B M F S by
addition of principles X1 to Xn to the theory.
According to Definition 3.8, M F S and BT ′4′E ′M F S are one and the same theory.
We shall now discuss some consequences and state some theorems of M F S and B M F S
respectively. First, note that since (T -I ntro) is a rule of B M F S the standard rule of
necessitation is an admissible rule of B M F S and thus M F S. Moreover, due to the rule
of (T -Elim) the rule of conecessitation is also admissible if we add (T ′) to the axioms of
(B M F S); that is, conecessitation is admissible in M F S. Thus M F S is closed under the
two following rules:
(NecN )
φ
Nφ (ConecN )
Nφ
φ
for all φ ∈ SentLPAT N .
Importantly, syntax theory, that is, PA turns out to be “rigid” in B M F S as we have
intended it to be.
THEOREM 3.9. For all φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LPA we have:
B M F S 	 ∀t1, . . . , tn(φ(V al(t1), . . . , V al(tn)) → Nφ( t1
.
, . . . , tn
.
))
Proof of Theorem 3.9. By induction over the positive built-up of φ(x1, . . . , xn). See
Stern (2012). 
Amongst other things the proof of Theorem 3.9 hinges on the modal axioms (RegN ),
(N D), and (B F) and as we have indicated this was our principal reason for adding these
principles to the axioms of B M F S and M F S respectively. We take it to be an interesting
and important question to develop versions of B M F S and M F S which use alternative
syntax theories and which could thus be formulated without appeal to (RegN ), (N D), and
(B F) in their full generality, but this is a topic for possible future research.
3.2.2. Contingent modal theories. So far we have constructed modal theories over a
theory of truth and a given syntax theory, which we took to be PA. Within this setting
no contingent vocabulary is added to the language and it might seem that we have failed
to construct a philosophically interesting modal theory, as the interesting characteristics
of the modal notions only arise in the presence of contingent vocabulary. However, the
main reason for this omission is that nothing but further complication is gained with
respect to our particular investigation if contingent vocabulary is added to the language.
For this reason we shall stick to the framework we have presented so far in the remain-
der of the paper, yet we sketch out how a contingent modal theory may be constructed.
To this end we consider the extension of the language LPAT N by a contingent n-place
predicate Pn . We call this language LC . We try to keep the framework as simple as
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possible, so we only consider extensions of the language by one predicate, but an extension
by multiple predicates would follow the same outlines.13 In the presence of the contingent
predicate Pn the underlying theory of truth needs to be supplemented by an additional
axiom dealing with this predicate:
(F SC) ∀t1, . . . , tn(Pn V al(t1), . . . , V al(tn) ↔ T P. t1, . . . , tn)
Let  be a modal theory in the language LPAT N . We call  in the language LC supple-
mented by (F SC) C . The contingency of the newly introduced predicate Pn will depend
on the contingency of the theory  axiomatizing it. In particular, this means that the rules
introducing the modal predicate are only applicable if a formula has been derived within
the corresponding theory C without appeal to the axioms or rules of the contingent theory
. If (T -Nec) is the only rule introducing the modal predicate, the theory  +C will be
the theory consisting of all the rules and axioms of C and  but where the rule (T -Nec)
is restricted in the afore mentioned way.
After these preliminary observations about M F S, its subtheories and how the theories
relate to modal theories with contingent vocabulary we shall now show that M F S is an
adequate modal theory, in the sense that it preserves theoremhood with respect to the modal
operator logic S5.
3.3. Modal operator logic and M F S. We show that the translations of all theorems of
S5 are theorems of M F S. Implicitly we even provide a more general result. We show—
at least for the modal principles we have discussed—that the modal theory B M F S + X ′
preserves theoremhood modulo translation with respect to a given normal modal logic K X .
As modal operator logic is well entrenched in mathematical and philosophical practice
this criterion seems to be a minimal requirement that an interesting modal theory should
fulfill.14
However, one disclaimer seems appropriate at this point. Throughout this paper we shall
only be concerned with de dicto modality and ignore problems arising with respect to
de re modality.15 This will show in the formation rules of the modal operator language
we are about to construct over LPA since we only allow the modal operator to apply to
sentences of the language and not to arbitrary (open) formulas. As a matter of fact the
modal operator language will be a multimodal language since we introduce a further modal
operator to account for truth, that is, we consider ‘’ as the modal operator and ‘’ as the
truth operator.
DEFINITION 3.10. The multimodal operator language LPA consists of the vocabulary
of LPA together with the modal operators ‘’ and ‘’. The formation rules of LPA are
given by:
13 We do not introduce new names to the language because these could of course be considered as
one-place predicates.
14 Amongst others, des Rivières & Levesque (1986) already showed that the translation of the
deductive closure of a consistent modal operator logic into LPAN forms a consistent set. Yet,
to our knowledge no axiomatization of these sets has been provided by means of principled and
unrestricted axioms within a language containing a modal predicate.
15 As we have set up things there is no such thing as de re modality in the predicate approach.
Quine (1977) and, Belnap & Gupta (1993) (cf. 237/38) suggest treating the modal predicate as
a two-place predicate applying to the code of a formula and the code of a sequence of objects
(thus similar to a satisfaction predicate) in order to recover de re reading in this context. See also
Halbach & Welch (2009) for remarks to this effect.
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φ ::= ψ | ¬φ |φ |φ |φ ∧ φ
with ψ ∈ SentLPA .
Next we define a translation from LPA to LPAT N .
DEFINITION 3.11. Let τ be a function from LPA to LPAT N . τ is called a translationfunction iff τ is regular, that is, it commutes with the logical connectives, is the identity
function on LPA and respects the conditions:
τ(φ) :=
{
T τ(ψ) , if φ .= ψ
Nτ(ψ) , if φ .= ψ
Before we can give the main theorem of this section we need to say a bit more about the
modal operator logic we shall work with. Above we stated our aim as showing that M F S
preserves theoremhood with respect to the modal operator logic S5, but this obviously only
accounts for the modal principles of the modality under consideration but not for truth. In
the modal operator setting we take truth, that is the operator ‘’, to be aptly characterized
by the Tarski biconditionals, that is the modal principle
(T r) φ ↔ φ
THEOREM 3.12. Let PAS5 be the theory resulting from the addition of the modal logic S5
axiomatizing the -operator and the modal principle (T r) axiomatizing  to the axioms
of PA. Furthermore, let τ be a translation function in the sense of Definition 3.11. Then for
all φ ∈ LPA
PAS5 	 φ ⇒ M F S 	 τ(φ).
For the proof of Theorem 3.12 we rely heavily on the following lemma which states that
for all sentences of LPAT N in the range of τ we can derive the Tarski biconditionals. We
omit a detailed proof of this lemma.
LEMMA 3.13. If τ is a translation in the sense of Definition 3.11, then for all φ ∈ LPA
B M F S 	 T τ(φ) ↔ τ(φ)
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. 
Proof of Theorem 3.12. The theorem is established by an induction on the length of a
proof in PAS5. For sake of illustration we give the proof in full.
(i) We need to show that the translation of all the axioms of S5 are provable in MFS.
This is obvious for the arithmetical axioms. For the remaining axioms we observe:
1. By Lemma 3.13 we have M F S 	 τ(φ ↔ φ) which settles the case of
(T r).
2. (T )—By (T’) we have for all φ ∈ LPA , M F S 	 Nτ(φ) → T τ(φ).
Again using Lemma 3.13 we derive M F S 	 Nτ(φ) → τ(φ).
3. (4)—M F S 	 T Nτ(φ) → NNτ(φ) by (4′) and as before Lemma
3.13 allows us to terminate the proof of this case.
4. (E)—As for (T ′) and (4′), but using (E ′) and Lemma 3.13.
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(ii) Obviously, M F S is closed under modus ponens. Moreover, since M F S is closed
under necessitation if M F S 	 τ(φ), then M F S 	 Nτ(φ) and thus M F S 	
τ(φ). 
From the perspective of modal operator logic the system M F S therefore proves to be
an adequate modal theory and as such M F S satisfies the minimal adequacy condition we
expect a modal theory to fulfill.16 We now turn toward the discussion of semantic aspects
of M F S.
§4. Semantics for M F S. In adopting the theory F S as our underlying theory of truth
we have excluded, or so it seems, the very possibility of providing an interesting class
of models or semantics for our theory M F S. Since F S is a subtheory of M F S, M F S is
ω-inconsistent17 and we therefore cannot interpret the arithmetical vocabulary of the theory
in its intended way, that is we cannot construct a model for M F S based on the standard
model of arithmetic.
However, at the beginning of this paper we have already pointed to a result which
suggests that, nonetheless, there might be an interesting semantic story to be told about
M F S. As shown by Halbach (1994), F S axiomatizes revision semantics up to the first
transfinite ordinal ω. The hope would be that a similar result holds for M F S and a suitable
modal version of revision semantics. Since our investigation will generalize and extend
Halbach’s result to the modal setting we briefly present his work.
4.1. Revision Semantics and F S. We present some ideas of revision semantics and
explain its connection to F S. We closely follow Halbach (1994, 2011). The basic idea of
revision semantics is often presented as follows.18 Starting from an arbitrary interpretation
of the truth predicate (“an initial guess”) we obtain better and better interpretations of the
truth predicate by a suitable series of revisions. From a formal point of view this revision
process can be characterized by appeal to a revision operator which we call a classical
jump. The classical jump takes a subset of ω, that is, a possible interpretation of the truth
predicate, as an argument and provides a new subset of ω, that is, the revised interpretation
of the truth predicate, as an output.
DEFINITION 4.1 (Classical Jump). Let 
 be an operation from P(ω) to P(ω). 
 is called
a classical jump iff for every S ⊆ ω

(S) := {#φ : (N, S) | φ}
where φ ∈ SentLPAT .
With this definition at hand one can define iterative applications of the revision operator

n(S), by letting 
0(S) = S, 
n+1(S) = 
(
n(S)), and thereby illustrate the revision
process on the finite ordinals.
16 One might wonder whether τ is in fact a faithful interpretation of PAS5 into M F S. The answer
is negative for a trivial reason: F S, and as a consequence M F S, is arithmetically stronger than
PA, however, PAS5 is not. Since τ is the identity function on the arithmetical vocabulary, the
existence of arithmetical sentences provable in M F S but not PAS5 rules out the possibility of τ
being a faithful interpretation. For example, PAS5 	 Con PA but M F S 	 τ(Con PA) where by
definition τ(Con PA) = Con PA.
17 See McGee (1985) for a proof of the ω-inconsistency of F S (and thus M F S).
18 For an in depth presentation of revision semantics cf. Belnap & Gupta (1993).
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Halbach (1994, 2011) suggests a change of perspective with respect to the revision
process. Instead of viewing the revision process as a way of obtaining better and better
interpretations of the truth predicate, we consider it to be a process of eliminating unsuit-
able interpretations. The idea is that when we start the revision process every subset of ω
is a possible interpretation of the truth predicate. But by application of the jump operation
we exclude certain subsets of ω as possible interpretations of the truth predicate. The idea
can be captured by defining a revision operator on sets of sets of natural numbers, that is
on subsets of P(ω). To this end let M ⊆ P(ω) and set

[M] := {
(S) : S ∈ M}
Iterative applications of 
 to subsets M of P(ω), 
n[M], are defined as to be expected:

0[M] = M, 
n+1[M] = 
[
n[M]]. With this second revision operator at hand we can
already sketch out the connection between F S and revision semantics: Every subset of ω
that is a member 
n[P(ω)] is a suitable interpretation of the subtheory of F S which results
from F S by restricting the number of applications of the rules (T -I ntro) and (T -Elim) to
n − 1. As a consequence these subtheories of F S have nice standard models.
In order to state this semantic adequacy result in a precise way we define the mentioned
subtheories of FS:
DEFINITION 4.2 (Subtheories of F S). The subtheories F Sn of F S are defined as follows.
F S0 := PAT , F S1 is the theory consisting of all axioms of F S together with the reflection
principle (RefT ) for PAT and F Sn+1 is F S except that the number of applications of
(T -I ntro) and (T -Elim) in a proof is limited to n.
We can now specify the link between revision semantics and F S.
THEOREM 4.3 (Halbach). For all n ∈ ω and all S ⊆ ω
S ∈ 
n[P(ω)] ⇔ (N, S) | F Sn
Proof. See Halbach (1994, 2011). 
This theorem leaves us with a method for constructing standard models for subsystems
of FS. In the next section we provide an analogous result for M F S with respect to modal
revision semantics we shall now develop.
4.2. Modal revision semantics. The idea behind modal revision semantics is to com-
bine revision semantics with ideas from possible world semantics for modal operator logic.
Ultimately this leads to a relativization of the jump operation to a modal frame. Besides
the frame we also introduce an evaluation function into the picture, a function that assigns
to every world an interpretation of the truth predicate. A frame and an evaluation function
induce a model for LPAT N relative to each world by taking the interpretation of the modal
predicate to be the intersection of the interpretations of the truth predicate at all accessible
worlds. Implicitly, the jump operation is then applied to these models and we thereby obtain
a new interpretation of the truth predicate at each world which then yields a new evaluation
function. Accordingly, the modal revision operator works on evaluation functions relative
to a frame.
Let us sketch out these introductory remarks and provide the formal definitions.19
19 Semantic theories of truth and possible world semantics have been combined by several authors
in constructing a semantics for modal predicates. See, for example Asher & Kamp (1989),
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DEFINITION 4.4 (Frame, evaluation function). Let W = ∅ be a set of labeled natural
number structures20 and R ⊆ W × W a dyadic relation on W . Then F = 〈W, R〉 is called
a frame. A function f : W → P(ω) is called an evaluation function for a frame F. The set
of all evaluation functions of a frame F is denoted by V alF .
An evaluation function is a function that provides an interpretation (extension) of the
truth predicate at every world w.
DEFINITION 4.5 (Models for LPAT N ). If F is a frame and f an evaluation function, then
F and f induce a model Mw = 〈w, f (w), Yw〉 of the language LPAT N relative to every
world w. f (w) is the extension of the truth predicate at w and Yw where
Yw =
⋂
v∈[wR]
f (v)
is the extension of the necessity predicate.21 [wR] is short for the set {v ∈ W : wRv}. We
often write F, w | f φ to convey the fact that Mw | φ whenever Mw is the model induced
by the frame F and the evaluation function f relative to w. We write F, f | φ if and only
if ∀w(F, w |f φ).
DEFINITION 4.6 (Modal Classical Jump). Let V alF be the set of evaluation functions
of a frame F. The modal classical jump 
F is an operation on V alF such that for all
w ∈ W
[
F ( f )](w) = {#φ : F, w | f φ}
Also, set 
0F ( f ) = f and 
n+1F ( f ) = 
F (
nF ( f )).
After these initial definitions we can now basically rerun Halbach’s construction that
we have sketched in the preceding section. As in the case of standard revision semantics
we need to view the modal revision process as a process where more and more evaluation
functions get ruled out. We therefore extend the definition of 
F and allow for applications
of 
F to sets of valuation functions of F .
DEFINITION 4.7. Let 
F be a jump and M ⊆ V alF a set of valuation functions on F.
Then

F [M] = {
F ( f ) : f ∈ M}.
As before we define iterative applications of 
F by 
0F [M]= M and 
n+1F [M]=
[
n[M]].
The fact that we can view the modal revision process as a process of eliminating un-
suitable evaluation functions depends on the antitonicity of the jump operation on V alF
relative to a frame F , that is, the jump eliminates more and more evaluation functions from
V alF . Actually, due to the ω-inconsistency of F S (and therefore M F S and B M F S) there
will be no evaluation functions left at the stage ω, that is 
ωF [V alF ] = ∅ (cf. Halbach
Belnap & Gupta (1993), Halbach et al. (2003), Leitgeb (2006), and Halbach & Welch (2009).
Asher and Kamp, Belnap and Gupta, and Halbach et al. also work in the setting of the revision
theory of truth, although our approach is somewhat different.
20 If we would allow for a contingent predicate Pn , as discussed in section 3.2.2, a world would be
a tuple (N, X) with X ⊆ ωn . X would serve as the interpretation of Pn at this world.
21 We assume
⋂
to be an operation on P(ω). Thus in particular if [wR] = ∅, then ⋂v∈[wR]f (v) = ω.
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(1994, 2011) for more on this).22 We now show that the modal jump is indeed antitone on
V alF .
LEMMA 4.8 (Antitonicity). For all n, m ∈ ω with n ≤ m and any frame F

mF [V alF ] ⊆ 
nF [V alF ]
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. We omit the proof as it consists in adopting
Halbach’s proof (cf. Halbach, 2011, p. 165) to the modal setting. 
Further we introduce some notational conventions and define the subsystems of B M F S
and M F S analogously to the case of F S.
DEFINITION 4.9. For all n ∈ ω if for all evaluation functions f ∈ 
nF (F, w | f φ)
(n ∈ ω) we write F, w |n φ. If n = 0 we drop the index and simply write F, w | φ.
Similarly, if ∀w(F, w |n φ) we write F |n φ.
DEFINITION 4.10 (Subsystems of B M F S). The subsystems B M F Sn for n ∈ ω of B M F S
are defined as follows. We set B M F S0 to be PAT N and B M F S1 to consist of all axioms
of B M F S and the rule (T -Nec) together with the reflection principle (RefT ) for PAT N.
Finally we define B M F Sn+1 to be just like B M F S except that the number of applications
of the rules (T -I ntro) and (T -Elim) in a proof is limited to n.
The systems B X1 . . . Xm M F Sn are defined correspondingly with B X1 . . . Xm M F S0 =
B M F S0 = PAT N.
We can now establish the central result linking the modal theories arising from F S to
modal revision semantics. In its most general form the result links the theory B M F S to
modal revision semantics: we show that B M F S axiomatizes modal revision semantics
up to the first transfinite ordinal ω. While this result is concerned with B M F S only, the
theorem also implies a nice adequacy result for MFS.
THEOREM 4.11. Let F be a frame and 
F a modal classical jump. Then for all n ∈ ω
f ∈ 
nF [V alF ] ⇔ F | f B M F Sn
Proof. The proof is a rather straightforward generalization of Halbach’s proof of Theo-
rem 4.3 and goes by induction on n. The left-to-right direction of the claim can be checked
by a sub-induction on the length of a proof in B M F Sn . For the converse direction, we
construct an evaluation function g such that 
F (g) = f . If we can show that g is an
evaluation function at the previous level, we can use the induction hypothesis and the
definition of 
F to conclude to the desired.
We start with the case n = 0. In this case there is nothing to show because any structure
of LPAT N based on the natural number structure is a model of PATN and thus of B M F S0.
Since 
0F [V alF ] = V alF we are done.
For n = 1, we first show that if f ∈ 
1F [V alF ], then ∀w ∈ W (F, w | f B M F S1).
This is established by a sub-induction on the length of a derivation in B M F S1, and is left
to the reader. For the converse direction, closely following Halbach (2011), we assume
f ∈ V alF and ∀w ∈ W (F, w | f B M F S1) and construct an evaluation g such that

F (g) = f . Since g ∈ V alF = 
0F [V alF ] it then follows that f ∈ 
1F [V alF ] . We set g
22 We take 
ωF [M] to be
⋂
n∈ω

nF [M].
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to be the evaluation function such that for all w ∈ W :
g(w) := {tN : #T t ∈ f (w)}23
Obviously g ∈ V alF , that is, g is an evaluation function on F . We now claim that 
F (g) =
f . The latter claim is established by an induction on the built up of sentences of LPAT N .
Again this is routine and follows the outlines of Halbach (2011). Nonetheless we present
the case of ‘Nt’ as this illustrates the important role of the axiom (I A).
#Nt ∈ f (w) ⇔ F, w | f T Nt Def. 4.5
⇔ F, w | f NT t (I A)
⇔ ∀v(wRv ⇒ #T t ∈ f (v)) Def. 4.5
⇔ ∀v(wRv ⇒ tN ∈ g(v)) Def. g
⇔ F, w |g Nt De f. 4.5
⇔ #Nt ∈ [
F (g)](w) Def. 4.6
This concludes the proof for the case n = 1.
It remains to show the induction step, that is the case n + 1. This again consists in
basically rewriting the proof of Theorem 3.12 in Halbach (1994, 2011). As induction
hypothesis we may assume that
f ∈ 
nF [V alF ] ⇔ ∀w ∈ W (F, w | f B M F Sn)
For the left-to-right direction assume then that f ∈ 
n+1F [V alF ]. By antitonicity of thejump on V alF we know that f ∈ 
nF [V alF ] and thus by induction hypothesis we have∀w ∈ W (F, w | f B M F Sn). It suffices then to show that one additional application of
(T -I ntro) and (T -Elim) preserves validity relative to f . In the case of (T -I ntro) we
know that B M F Sn 	 φ and therefore by induction hypothesis ∀w(F, w |n φ). But then
by Definitions 4.5 and 4.6, ∀w ∈ W (F, w |n+1 T φ) .
For the case of (T -Elim) we assume that B M F Sn 	 T φ. By induction hypothesis
and Definition 4.5, #φ ∈ f (w) for all w ∈ W and all f ∈ 
nF . By Definition 4.6 we
have ∀w ∈ W (F, w |g φ) with g ∈ 
n−1F [V alF ]. But by antitonicity 
n+1F [V alF ] ⊆

n−1F [V alF ] and thus for all f ∈ 
n+1F [V alF ],∀w ∈ W (F, w | f φ).
For the converse direction we copy our construction of step n = 1. The proof goes
through unaltered except that we need to show that the newly construed evaluation function
g is a member of 
nF [V alF ]. If we show that ∀w ∈ W (F, w |g B M F Sn), we can infer
to the desired using the induction hypothesis. To this end we observe that if B M F Sn 	 φ,
then B M F Sn+1 	 T φ and thus ∀w ∈ W (F, w | f T φ). But since 
F (g) = f it
follows that ∀w ∈ W (F, w |g φ). This ends our proof. 
Theorem 4.11 nicely ties B M F S and modal revision semantics together and, as we have
already mentioned, it also a nice adequacy result for M F S itself. It turns out that M F S
axiomatizes modal revision semantics up to ω relative to equivalence frames, that is frames
where the accessibility relation is an equivalence relation. This observation turns out to be
a corollary of a more general phenomenon which should appear familiar from possible
world semantics for modal operator logic:
23 tN stands for the denotation (the value) of t in the natural number structure.
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THEOREM 4.12. Let F be a frame and n ≥ 1. Then
(i) F is reflexive ⇔ F |n BT ′M F Sn
(i i) F is transitive ⇔ F |n B4′M F Sn
(i i i) F is Euclidean ⇔ F |n B E ′M F Sn .
Sketch of a proof. The left-to-right direction follows the outlines of the standard proofs
for modal operator logic (see e.g., Blackburn et al., 2001). For the converse we sketch the
proof of item (i): suppose for reductio that there is a w ∈ W with ¬wRw. Let κ be the
truth teller that is, the sentence saying of itself that it is true. Now let f ∈ V alF be an
evaluation with κ ∈ f (v) for all v ∈ W with wRv but ¬κ ∈ f (w). By properties of the
jump 
F we know that for all evaluation functions g, all worlds w and all n ∈ ω
(a) κ ∈ [
nF (g)](w) ⇒ κ ∈ [
n+1F (g)](w)
(b) ¬κ ∈ [
nF (g)](w) ⇒ ¬κ ∈ [
n+1F (g)](w)
Now, clearly 
nF ( f ) ∈ 
nF [V alF ] for n ∈ ω and F, w |
nF ( f ) Nκ. But on the other hand
we have F, w |
nF ( f ) T κ which contradicts the assumption. The converse direction of
items (ii) and (iii) works similarly. 
COROLLARY 4.13. Let F be a frame and n ≥ 1. Then
F is an equivalence frame ⇔ F |n M F Sn .
This corollary concludes the discussion of semantic aspects of M F S and thus the second
theme of our paper.24 It shows that M F S nicely ties to modal revision semantics—a
semantics that combines revision semantics and possible world semantics. Unsurprisingly,
there is no hope for strengthening the foregoing results in the direction of results for
B M F S and M F S itself rather than for their subtheories as both theories are ω-inconsistent.
We move on to the last theme of our investigation, the “Kripke reduction”.
§5. The “Kripke reduction” and M F S. In this section we work out the details of
the “Kripke reduction” for the modal predicate of M F S, that is we investigate whether the
modal predicate of M F S can be understood as a truth predicate modified by a modal oper-
ator. In the present proof-theoretic setting, the question of whether the “Kripke reduction”
is feasible transforms into the question of whether M F S can be reduced to some theory of
truth formulated in the language LPAT , that is LPAT augmented by a modal operator ,25
assuming some reasonable underlying modal logic. Indeed, M F S should not be reduced
24 If we have a contingent predicate in our language, the relation between the contingent modal
theory and revision semantics may be stated as follows (terminology is adopted from section
3.2.2). Let F be a frame and 
F a modal classical jump. Moreover, let w∗ ∈ W be a distinguished
world for which w∗ | . Then for all n ∈ ω
f ∈ 
nF [V alF ] ⇔ (F, f ) | B M F SCn & F, w∗ | f B M F SCn + 
Similarly, the result for M F S carries over. Let F be a frame and n ≥ 1. Then
F is an equivalence frame ⇔ F |n M F SCn & F, w∗ | M F SCn + 
25 All formation rules are standard, that is, no restriction on the formation rules as in the case ofLPA
are in place. For this reason we have omitted giving a full fledged definition of the language.
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to any theory of truth but to F S formulated in LPAT for otherwise the “truth” predicate
of the target theory would not be a truth predicate in the sense of M F S and, arguably, we
would have failed to “reduce” the modal predicate to the truth predicate modified by the
modal operator.
If we formulate F S in LPAT we need to provide a further axiom which deals with the
interaction of the modal operator and the truth predicate. We denote this modified version
of F S by F S.
DEFINITION 5.1 (F S). The theory F S consists of all axioms and rules of F S in the
language LPAT together with the following axiom:
(I A) ∀x(Sent (x) → (T x ↔ T 
.
x))
F S does not give us any information concerning the modal properties of the -
operator as they depend on the underlying modal logic assumed.26 To be sure, this was
how we intended it to be for the “logical” properties of the boolean connectives or the
quantifier are also determined by the underlying logic, that is classical first-order logic,
and not by the theory of truth. The set of theorems of F S will therefore depend on the
modal logic assumed. As M F S is meant to capture a modal notion somewhat related to
the modal operator logic S5 we assume the modal principles and rules of this very system
in addition to the axioms of standard first-order logic. In addition, we stipulate the axioms
of “necessity of distinctness” and the “Barcan formula”
(N D) ∀x, y(x = y → x = y)
(B F) ∀xφ → ∀xφ
and call the resulting modal logic QS5, that is, “quantified S5”.27 We write F S 	S φ iff
φ is derivable in F S assuming the modal operator logic S. Thus, in particular F S 	QS5
φ denotes the fact that φ is derivable in F S assuming the underlying modal logic to be
QS5.
Already in the modal operator logic QK , K in first-order logic plus the modal principles
(N D) and (B F) we can prove the rigidity of syntax:
LEMMA 5.2. For all φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LPA
F S 	QK ∀x1, . . . , xn(φ(x1, . . . , xn) → φ(x1, . . . , xn))
Proof. By induction over the positive built up of φ. 
Amongst other things, the latter proof hinges on the fact the following principles
(N I) ∀x, y(x = y → x = y)
(C B F) ∀xφ → ∀xφ
are theorems of QK .
26 F S is consistent in all consistent normal modal logics. Depending on the normal modal logic at
stake we may give an interpretation of F S in F S by translating φ by φ or by s = s for some
term s.
27 Actually, (N D) and (B F) are derivable in S5 iff standard first-order logic with identity is
assumed. See Fitting & Mendelsohn (1998) for proofs of these facts. We have nonetheless decided
to explicitly mention (N D) and (B F) as these are the only additional principles we need to
add to the smallest normal modal logic K iff we wish to reduce B M F S to F S. But in K ,
assuming standard first-order logic, neither (N D) nor (B F) are derivable.
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In order to reduce or interpret M F S in F S assuming the underlying modal operator
logic to be QS5 we need to provide a translation function from LPAT N to LPAT where
this translation should interpret the modal predicate ‘N ’ as ‘T ’ and keep the remain-
ing vocabulary fixed. It turns out that we can use the translation function provided by
Halbach & Welch (2009), if we add a further clause taking care of the truth predicate of
LPAT N .28
As Halbach and Welch point out defining the translation function by a simple recursion
over ω will not work in this case because within self-referential or “ungrounded” sentences
the necessity and the truth predicate, implicitly, occur infinitely many times. Thus there will
be no starting point from where to start a simple recursion. Fortunately, due to the recursion
theorem we know that a translation function of the desired kind exists:
LEMMA 5.3 (Halbach and Welch). There is a translation function ρ from LPAT N to
LPAT with the following properties
ρ(φ) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ , if φ .= (s = t)
Tρ•(s) , if φ .= T s, for some term s
Tρ•(s) , if φ .= Ns, for some term s
¬ρ(ψ) , if φ .= ¬ψ
ρ(ψ) ∧ ρ(χ) , if φ .= ψ ∧ χ
∀xρ(ψ) , if φ .= ∀xψ
0 , if otherwise
Here, the function symbol ρ• represents the primitive recursive function ρ and thus if
s is the name of a formula φ, then ρ•(s) will be the name of the formula ρ(φ). As an
example consider the formula NT 0 = 0. By definition of ρ, ρ(NT 0 = 0) =
Tρ•(T 0 = 0) and since ρ•(T 0 = 0) = ρ(T 0 = 0) = Tρ•(0 = 0) and
ρ•(0 = 0) = ρ(0 = 0) = 0 = 0 we get ρ(NT 0 = 0) = T T 0 = 0.
With this translation function at hand we can carry out the reduction of M F S to F S
assuming QS5.
THEOREM 5.4. For all φ ∈ LPAT N , if M F S 	 φ, then F S 	QS5 ρ(φ).
The main work in the proof of Theorem 5.4 is done by the following lemma:
LEMMA 5.5. Let QS5 be the underlying modal operator logic. Then the following are
theorems of F S:
(i) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent (∀vx
.
) → (V al(s) = V al(t) → (T x(t/v) ↔ T x(s/v))))
(ii) ∀s, t (V al(s) = V al(t) → T s = t)
(iii) ∀x, v(Sent (∀
.
vx) → (∀tT x(t/v) → T∀yx))
(iv) ∀x, y(Sent (x →
.
y) → (T (x →
.
y) → (T x → T y)))
(v) ∀t (T T
.
t ↔ T 
.
T
.
t)
(vi) ∀x(Sent (x) → (T x → T x))
(vii) ∀t (T 
.
T
.
t → T 
.
T
.
t)
(viii) ∀t (T ¬
.

.
T
.
t → T ¬
.

.
T
.
t)
28 As we have mentioned in passing in the introduction, Halbach & Welch (2009) have recently
carried out the “Kripke-reduction” semantically. They show that the translation function we
provide below is truth preserving with respect to two intended semantics.
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Proof. We hint at the proofs of item (i)–(vi) but provide detailed proofs of items
(vii)–(viii). (i) follows from Lemma 5.2, the modal properties of QS5 and the fact that
(RegT ) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent (∀vx. ) → (V al(s) = V al(t) → (T x(t/v) ↔ T x(s/v))))
is a theorem of (F S). (ii) by (F S1), Lemma 5.2 and QS5; (iii) by Lemma 5.2, (F S4)
and QS5. (iv) is a direct consequence of (KT ), Lemma 5.2 and QS5. (v) is an immediate
consequence of (I A). (vi) follows directly from the modal axiom (T ).
(vii) By generalization we may derive from an instance of (4), ∀x(T x → T x). This
serves as the starting point of our derivation:
1. ∀x(T x → T x) (4)
2. ∀tT (
.
T
.
t →
.

.

.
T
.
t) 1, (T -I ntro), (F S4)
3. ∀t (T 
.
T
.
t → T 
.

.
T
.
t) (KT )
4. T 
.

.
T
.
t ↔ T 
.
T
.
t (I A)
5. ∀t (T 
.
T
.
t → T 
.
T
.
t) 3, 4
(viii) By first-order logic and (E) we derive ∀t (¬T T
.
t → ¬T T
.
t) and then reason
as follows:
1. ∀t (¬T T
.
t → ¬T T
.
t)
2. ∀t (¬T T
.
t ↔ T ¬
.

.
T
.
t) (I A), (F S2)
3. ∀t (¬T T
.
t ↔ T ¬
.

.
T
.
t) 2, (Nec)
4. ∀t(¬T T
.
t ↔ T ¬
.

.
T
.
t) 3, (C B F), Lemma 5.2
5. ∀t (¬T T
.
t ↔ T ¬
.

.
T
.
t) 4, (K )
6. ∀t (T ¬
.

.
T
.
t ↔ T ¬
.

.
T
.
t) 1, 2, 5

Before we give the proof of Theorem 5.4 we need one further lemma which tells us that
we can prove certain properties about ρ in F S:
LEMMA 5.6. The following is provable in PA and thus in F S:
(i) ∀x(SentLPAT N (x) → SentLPAT (ρ
•(x)))
(ii) ∀x(SentLPA(x) → ρ•(x) = x)
Proof. By formalizing the properties of ρ. 
We provide the proof of the main theorem:
Proof of Theorem 5.4. The proof is an induction on the length of a proof in MFS. Lemma
5.5 together with Lemma 5.6 establishes the base of the induction since it is easily verified
that the eight axioms of M F S extending F S translate into the modal principles (i)–(viii) of
Lemma 5.5. As a sample case we discuss the axiom (T ′), that is, we show the translation
of (T ′) to be provable, if we assume the underlying modal logic to be QS5:
1. ∀x(SentLPAT (x) → (T x → T x)) Lemma 5.5: (vi)
2. ∀x(SentLPAT (ρ
•(x)) → (Tρ•(x) → Tρ•(x))) 1
3. ∀x(SentLPAT N (x) → (Tρ•(x) → Tρ•(x))) 2, Lemma 5.6: (i)
4. ∀x(SentLPAT N (x) → (ρ(N x) → ρ(T x))) 3, Lemma 5.3
5. ρ(∀x(SentLPAT N (x) → (N x → T x))) 4, Lemma 5.3
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For the induction step we observe that since F S is closed under (T -I ntro) and (Nec) is
a rule of proof of the underlying modal logic QS5 if F S 	QS5 ρ(φ), then F S 	QS5
Tρ•(φ) and hence F S 	QS5 ρ(Nφ). (T -I ntro) and (T -Elim) do not cause any
trouble and we conclude to the desired. 
With this proof ends our discussion of the Kripke-reduction as we have shown the theory
M F S to be “Kripke-reducible” to the theory F S assuming the modal logic QS5. As we
have pointed out in the introduction this should not be understood as a result favoring
operator approaches to modality, but rather to provide a conceptual insight into why our
strategy for constructing modal theories has proven to be successful in the present case.29
§6. Conclusion. In this paper we have presented a general strategy of constructing
modal theories over theories of truth and we have tested this strategy with respect to the
axiomatic theory of truth Friedman-Sheard. This led to the development and the evaluation
of the theory of Modal Friedman-Sheard. The theory proved to be adequate from the
perspective of modal operator logic as it was shown that M F S preserves theoremhood
with respect to the modal operator logic S5 modulo translation. We also presented modal
revision semantics and showed that M F S axiomatizes this semantic theory in a certain
way: Modal revision semantics provides us with the suitable interpretations for the truth
and the modal predicate in standard models of the subtheories of M F S. A third theme
we discussed in our paper was the “Kripke reduction” which suggests an understanding of
the modal predicate in terms of the truth predicate and a modal operator. This third theme
should not be viewed as part of the evaluation of the theory M F S but as an attempt of
understanding why the general strategy we have proposed worked so well. The success
of the reduction suggests that the way we have axiomatized the modal predicate leaves us
with but one potentially paradoxical concept, namely the concept of truth.
We take our findings to show that Modal Friedman-Sheard is a viable modal theory
which should be rather attractive to the modal theorist, so long as she accepts the underlying
theory of truth. This indicates that the general strategy for developing modal theories over
theories of truth is promising strategy to pursue. However, there are many theories of truth
available and it needs to be seen how widely applicable the strategy is. Therefore, it seems
fitting to test the strategy we have developed using alternative theories of truth. In partic-
ular, this seems interesting because the theory Friedman-Sheard is often dismissed due to
its ω-inconsistency. We will take up this task in the second part of our investigation and
test our strategy by applying it to the axiomatic theory of truth Kripke-Feferman. Testing
our strategy using the theory of truth Kripke-Feferman should give us some feedback on
how widely applicable our strategy is since the theories of truth Friedman-Sheard and
Kripke-Feferman are very different in character. While Friedman-Sheard is a symmetric
but ω-inconsistent theory, Kripke-Feferman is nonsymmetric but ω-consistent. Therefore,
if it turns out that the strategy we have presented works in both cases, we think there is
29 The “Kripke reduction” remains feasible, if we allow for a contingent predicate in our language.
Of course, F S needs to be supplemented with the axiom (F SC) we discussed in section 3.2.2.
Call this theory F SC . Moreover, we need to guarantee that the underlying modal logic treats
the contingent theory  as such, that is the rule of (Nec) will no longer be applicable once a -
axiom or rule has been used in a proof. The translation function ρ will act as the identity function
on sentences of the form Pnt1, . . . , tn . It is then straightforward to derive that for all φ ∈ LC
M F SC +  	 φ ⇒ F SC +  	QM5 ρ(φ)
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good reason to believe that we have developed a widely applicable strategy for constructing
modal theories.
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